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Abstract
How do governments address complex, cross-sectoral problems, like the COVID-19
pandemic? Why were some Latin American countries more successful at containing
the pandemic’s most devastating health outcomes? We argue that national governments
that were more collaborative in their response to COVID-19 were more successful in
reducing death rates. Our original dataset offers a novel attempt to operationalise col-
laborative governance (CG). We undertake simple statistical tests to measure the rela-
tionship between CG and COVID-19-related mortality rates in Latin America. We then
choose three case studies to assess whether collaboration was meaningful in practice.
Initial evidence suggests governments that pursued CG were more effective at contain-
ing mortality rates early on in the pandemic. The collaboration helped to foster cooper-
ation over resources; buy time to prepare for a potential case surge; and produce a
unified message regarding what citizens should do to prevent viral spread.
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¿Cómo los gobiernos dan cuenta de problemas complejos y multidimensionales como la
pandemia COVID-19? ¿Por qué algunos países de América Latina han sido más exitosos
al contener los efectos sanitarios más devastadores? En este trabajo se argumenta que
los gobiernos nacionales que fueron más colaborativos en su respuesta al COVID-19
han sido más exitosos al reducir las tasas de mortalidad. Se propone una base de
datos original que ofrece un intento de operacionalizar la gobernanza colaborativa
(GC). Se realizan testeos estadísticos simples que miden la relación entre GC y la
tasa de mortalidad relacionada a COVID-19 en América Latina. Luego se hacen tres
estudios de caso para observar si la colaboración ha sido sustantiva en la práctica. La
evidencia inicial sugiere que los gobiernos que impulsaron la GC han sido más efectivos
en contener las tasas de mortalidad al comienzo de la pandemia. La colaboración ayudó
a: impulsar cooperación sobre los recursos; ganar tiempo para prepararse para un
potencial crecimiento de casos; y producir un mensaje unificado para la ciudadanía
sobre comportamientos para evitar la expansión viral.
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Introduction
COVID-19 has spread like wildfire across the globe, impacting national health systems,
the economy, a country’s fiscal solvency, and its social safety nets. Responses to the pan-
demic vary greatly (Azerrat et al., 2021), as has government capacity to contain its spread.
Epidemiological, demographic, and socioeconomic factors cannot fully account for these
differences. Political factors, for example, seem to better explain the stringency of
government-mandated responses to the pandemic (Bennouna et al., 2020). Policy and
politics matter as well for explaining different COVID-19-related outcomes (Greer
et al., 2020). Nevertheless, we have yet to understand fully how political factors mitigate
the most catastrophic consequences of the pandemic, including widespread death.
In this paper, we argue that how governments choose to address the pandemic matters
in terms of staving off the worst health outcomes. We hypothesize that national govern-
ments that pursue collaboration when designing containment policies will be more suc-
cessful in reducing COVID-19-related deaths. A pandemic represents a “wicked”
problem. It is “dynamic and complex”; it “ignore[s] the boundaries that shape our
public sphere”; and it transcends “governmental, sectoral, jurisdictional, geographic,
and even conceptual demarcations” (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015, p. 7).
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Wicked problems are not easily resolved by agents from one level of government, one
issue area, or one organisation. Collaboration allows governments to pool resources,
knowledge, and experiences from across levels, areas, and organisations.
Consequently, policy effectiveness grows. We, therefore, suspect that when collaborative
governance (CG) underpins government responses to COVID-19, the worst health
impacts of the pandemic will be mitigated.
To test this claim, we build an original dataset that offers a novel attempt to operatio-
nalise CG at the country level for large-scale analysis. We then measure the impact of CG
on COVID-19-related mortality rates in Latin America. Finally, we examine the cases of
Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay in more detail to identify the potential mechanisms that
connect more collaboration to lower COVID-19-related mortality rates.
We find that certain types of collaboration matter. Specifically, collaboration across
levels of government and with social organisations yielded policy choices that helped
contain COVID-19-related deaths. In the following pages, we develop the theoretical
underpinnings of our hypothesis. Next, we describe the research design and provide a
first, quantitative examination of the relationship between CG and COVID-19 mortality
rates. Finally, we examine three case studies before briefly concluding.
The Role of Collaborative Governance in Pandemic Times
What political factors help explain the widespread differences in COVID-19-related con-
tagion and death rates across countries? Existing research is inconclusive. For example,
the relationship between regime type and COVID-19-related mortality rates is unclear.
Some found that authoritarian regimes were more successful in reducing death tolls
(Cepaluni et al., 2020; Cheibub et al., 2020). Democracies, to quote one study, “experi-
enced deaths sooner and on a larger scale” (Cepaluni et al., 2020, p. 24), likely because
their more delegative nature constrained the capacity to respond rapidly (Malesky and
London, 2014). Others found no clear relationship. Similar regimes have very different
success rates with the virus (González, 2020). Only some authoritarian regimes assert
the control necessary to successfully traverse major crises (Shih, 2020).
Democratic quality also has a variable impact. Some institutions and norms associated
with democracy, such as greater transparency or less corruption, have a negative relation-
ship with death reduction (Cepaluni et al., 2020). Other institutions, including rule of law,
horizontal accountability, or institutionalised party systems, exhibit no clear relationship
(González, 2020). Additionally, neither federal nor unitary systems have a clear advan-
tage when it comes to reducing COVID-19 mortality rates (González, 2020; Kincaid
and Leckrone, 2020).
The nature of political leadership also does not systematically explain COVID-19
responses. Populists, for example, have a mixed record when it comes to the pandemic.
Some populists, like Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and Donald Trump in the United States,
sowed uncertainty and minimised the seriousness of COVID-19 (Lasco, 2020; Smith,
2020). Others, like Andrej Babiš of the Czech Republic and Igor Matovič of Slovakia,
preferred to embrace scientific expertise for political gain. Their response was on
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balance effective, unlike that of Bolsonaro or Trump, even as they further weakened
checks and balances (Buštiková and Baboš, 2020).
The negative effects of populism on COVID-19-related outcomes may be tempered by
democratic institutions that constrain populist leaders. The most adverse effects of popu-
lism during the pandemic have been felt in “the world’s less democratic countries”
(Cepaluni et al., 2021, p. 4), where checks and balances are inherently weaker or non-
existent. Additionally, older democracies are more immune to the negative policy
effects of populist leaders than younger ones (Ruth-Lovell et al., 2019). Populist
leaders may politicise the pandemic (Lasco, 2020), upending good policy and wreaking
havoc on state institutions.1 Nevertheless, populism alone cannot explain
COVID-19-related health outcomes.
Ideology and partisanship do provide explanatory value (González, 2020; Kettl,
2020). Right-wing governments have a higher incidence of COVID-related-deaths per
capita than left-wing governments. The former may be reluctant to mandate policies
that reduce contagion but hurt the economy. Indeed, left-wing governing parties have
better health outcomes than right-wing parties in general (Falkenbach et al., 2020).
Nevertheless, the role of ideology is not sufficient for explaining variation in
COVID-19 outcomes. For example, some countries experienced dramatic shifts in
viral contagion during the same administration. Argentina was a world leader in terms
of COVID-19 containment during the first months of the pandemic. By early 2021,
however, those numbers had skyrocketed (Bianchi, forthcoming). Yet, the centre-left
government of Alberto Fernández remained unchanged.
Additionally, not all right- or left-wing governments are the same. Brazil’s right-wing
leader, Jair Bolsonaro, has done little to contain viral spread (Melo, 2020). Other
right-wing leaders, including Luis Lacalle of Uruguay, have been more successful.2
Overall, ideology may constrain the range of policy options available to a particular
administration. It cannot, however, fully explain the over-time change in one country,
or across countries where leaders espouse similar ideological positions.
One potent source of variation with respect to COVID-19-related health outcomes is
related to how leaders and governments choose to craft policy. Actors and interests reg-
ularly impinge on a government’s capacity to deliver goods and guarantee rights to its
citizens (Mainwaring and Scully, 2010, p. 1). This is especially true for a pandemic,
whose consequences transcend policy areas and impact different sectors of the population
in distinct ways.
COVID-19 is a “wicked” problem. It is “dynamic and complex, with no clear defin-
ition and no clear solution,” and it “ignore[s] the boundaries that shape our public sphere”
(Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015, p. 7). COVID-19 may be “one of the most complex pro-
blems that modern governments anywhere have faced” (Kettl, 2020, p. 600). Complex
problems defy any single policy response. Nevertheless, they put governance at the fore-
front of any analysis trying to assess their consequences (Azerrat et al., 2021, p. 147).
Wicked problems, such as COVID-19, demand complex responses that include the
input and expertise of multiple actors across different sectors. CG allows for this. CG
includes the “processes and structures of public policy decision making and management
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that engage people across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or
the public, private, and civic spheres to carry out a public purpose that could not other-
wise be accomplished” (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015, p. 18). CG acknowledges the
added value that other actors bring to policymaking. A CG approach deliberately
reaches across organisational, sectoral, and jurisdictional boundaries. It privileges multi-
actor deliberation and consensus-building (see, e.g. Ansell and Gash, 2008). CG works to
“pool” the knowledge base and experiences of different actors, leading to more respon-
sive policies (Bryson et al., 2006, p. 44).3
CG may be particularly useful in countries, such as many in Latin America, where
governments have fewer resources to leverage in the face of an immediate crisis.
Where limits on public resources exist, governments often turn to the private and non-
profit sectors (Bingham, 2011). CG can promote cooperation, rather than competition,
over resources.
Finally, CG may be effective against a pandemic, because it can compel a government
to buck the institutional inertia associated with its conventional approach to policy pro-
blems. Largely speaking, COVID-19 responses by governments have been “on-path”;
they largely reflect how governments typically respond to crises (Bambra et al., 2021).
When governments seek out expertise, knowledge, and/or resources through collabor-
ation with others, it can have the (unintended) impact of shifting the Overton Window,
or the spectrum of ideas on policy issues considered acceptable by the general public
(Lynch, 2020). CG may be a more effective approach at addressing COVID-19-related
health outcomes because the policies it produces are more palatable.
CG has potential downsides. The inclusion of more actors can complicate policymak-
ing. More actors mean more veto players, making consensus more difficult. Policies
designed collaboratively often take more time (Ansell and Gash, 2008). Yet, a pandemic
requires a rapid response. Pandemics are characterised by uncertainty, time pressure, a
lack of experience, and “potentially devastating consequences” (Liu et al., 2021,
p. 205). Centralised decision-making, therefore, may seem easiest when it comes to craft-
ing responses, especially in the first year (Cepaluni et al., 2020; Schwartz, 2012).
Additionally, the multi-dimensional nature of wicked problems means that policies
designed to address one issue may have unexpected negative consequences on another
issue (Luke, 1997). Policies create complex feedback effects from which new problems
emerge (Senge, 2006). This is true of all policies. Nevertheless, the question of how to
effectively collaborate when it comes to interconnected, “wicked” problems remains
unanswered (Bryson et al., 2006).
The complexity of a collaborative approach, as well as the time needed to orchestrate
the collaboration and then design the policy, may make collaboration prohibitively costly
for a government facing a pandemic. A desire to collaborate, and a belief in its results,
may not be enough for collaboration to occur. Consequently, in addition to evaluating
the impact of collaboration, a worthy empirical question following the COVID-19 out-
break is whether collaboration occurred at all.4
How do more collaborative governments fare vis-a-vis their less collaborative counter-
parts when it comes to addressing the COVID-19 pandemic? Early research suggests that
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collaboration produces better policy outcomes. In Mexico and the United States, govern-
ors that worked with each other tended to forge social distancing policies that were more
coordinated. Collaboration, in this case, led to greater policy alignment across subnational
territories (Bennouna et al., 2020), mitigating contagion across a greater geographic space.
Collaboration with social movements also yields qualitatively distinct outcomes.
Where social movements were involved in policymaking, as in Argentina, responses to
COVID-19 were designed to think beyond, while also addressing, the short-term needs
produced by the pandemic. By contrast, where social movements were excluded, as in
Brazil, social movements focused on short-term emergency responses (Abers et al.,
2021). The nature and quality of the policies varied as a result of whether the government
worked with social movements when crafting its pandemic response.
Overall, there is suggestive evidence that collaboration matters when it comes to
shaping policy responses to COVID-19. Nevertheless, this relationship has not been
tested systematically. In what follows, we test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: In countries where national governments collaborate more with differ-
ent actors, the negative health impacts of COVID-19 will be reduced.
Research Design
Measuring Collaborative Governance
CG is a concept that has typically been measured qualitatively (Douglas et al., 2020).
There are few guideposts regarding how to operationalise the measure. We view CG
to be an “umbrella term for myriad cross-boundary, multi-institutional arrangements”
(Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015, p. 8), where different stakeholders work toward a
common goal, like reducing the spread of COVID-19. Collaboration, consequently,
must include at least two actors or stakeholders.
We focus on collaboration that occurs between national government and other actors.
In a pandemic, most initial policy responses will emanate from the national government,
and especially the executive branch. The executive has the authority and the capacity to
quickly design and coordinate policy. Consequently, collaboration early on in the pan-
demic almost certainly included national government.
Collaboration entails the exploitation of different skillsets and knowledge bases
(Ansell and Gash, 2008). Collaborative actors may also have different interests when it
comes to the problem at hand. This diversity in terms of skills, knowledge, and interests
is what allows for creativity in policy design. Without it, the unique capacity of collab-
oration is diminished.
Our operationalisation of CG includes the interaction of the national executive with
five different stakeholders. Each offers a unique skillset, as well as diverse interests,
for addressing a pandemic. For example, inter-governmental CG involves interactions
between the national and subnational (local or regional) governments on
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COVID-19-based policy responses. Subnational governments understand the infrastruc-
tural weaknesses and resource challenges of pandemic responses in their constituencies.
Institutional CG includes collaboration among national ministries and/or across national
and subnational bureaucracies. These ministries and bureaucracies include technocrats and
bureaucrats who have specialised knowledge in policy areas while being attuned to political
challenges that public policymaking entails. CG in science and technology occurs between
national government and independent experts and scientists. The latter are autonomous
from politics and can objectively discuss, for example, the epidemiological, psychological,
and economic consequences of particular policy choices. Social CG occurs between national
government and social movements and unions – actors who advocate for marginalised
groups and can speak to and represent their challenges and demands when considering
policy options. Corporate CG occurs between national government and private companies.
The private sector has the resources and the connections to offer infrastructural support and
fund the research and development for innovative policy solutions.
Given the diversity of knowledge, interests, and skills of these five stakeholders, inter-
actions between the government and each are likely to involve deliberation and debate over
which policies should be prioritised and how they should be implemented. To return to
Emerson and Nabatchi’s definition of CG, interactions with each actor are likely to
produce policy responses that “could not otherwise be accomplished” (p. 18). We count
these interactions between the national executive and each stakeholder as instances of CG.
For each type of collaboration, we sought to answer a series of questions (see
Appendix 1) corresponding to a set of implications that should be observed if collabor-
ation took place. These questions examine whether the national government consulted
with each stakeholder on different economic, social, and health policies associated
with the pandemic. For example, for inter-governmental CG, we measured whether
policy planning and implementation involved meetings between national and subnational
governments. We assessed the temporal regularity of those meetings and the representa-
tiveness of each level of government. For institutional CG, we coded whether there were
formalised instances of policy planning and cooperation among national government
ministries (administrative CG) and/or among officials of national and subnational bureau-
cracies (inter-bureaucratic CG). We also coded whether the meetings included only repre-
sentatives from the ruling party or also from the opposition.
For CG in science and technology, we explored whether there was policy planning and
cooperation with independent health specialists and scientists. For social CG, we evalu-
ated whether there were instances of policy planning and cooperation with representatives
of social movements and unions. Finally, for corporate CG, we surveyed whether there
were instances of policy planning and/or public–private cooperation mechanisms with
private companies.
We coded most questions dichotomously. This means that we cannot get at the degree
to which collaboration occurred in any one instance, although a country does score higher
if collaboration was regular (vs. infrequent).5 Nevertheless, we asked multiple questions
for each dimension of collaboration. More positive responses across the battery of ques-
tions reflect a greater level of collaboration between the national government and a
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stakeholder. Each country received a separate score for all five types of collaboration. For
example, Argentina scored 14 (93 per cent) and Brazil scored 6 (40 per cent) for inter-
governmental CG (out of a total of 15, see Table 1).
Newspapers were our primary data-coding source. We selected a minimum of three in
each country (see Appendix 1), although when reports were contradictory we included
more. We chose newspapers with the highest number of readers but that also varied in
terms of their editorial and ideological positions. We triangulated the newspaper data,
when necessary, with information from official government sites, academic articles,
and experts on each country.
Overall, we collected data on the national executive’s collaboration with five different sta-
keholders during the first year of the pandemic (March 2020–end of January 2021) in eight-
een Latin American countries, including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica,DominicanRepublic, Ecuador, El Salvador,Guatemala, Honduras,Mexico,Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Latin America exhibits some of the
highest rates of inequality and economic informality in the world. National governments,
therefore, faced multiple, daunting tasks when reacting to the pandemic, including accessing
















Argentina 93% 92% 53% 79% 71%
Bolivia 80% 81% 53% 95% 65%
Brazil 40% 35% 20% 32% 65%
Chile 93% 96% 73% 74% 71%
Colombia 60% 77% 53% 42% 71%
Costa Rica 47% 73% 7% 42% 71%
Ecuador 33% 81% 80% 47% 41%
El Salvador 53% 38% 0% 26% 53%
Guatemala 67% 69% 60% 37% 59%
Honduras 87% 69% 67% 89% 88%
Mexico 53% 73% 40% 26% 65%
Nicaragua 20% 0% 0% 5% 0%
Panama 20% 69% 53% 21% 76%
Paraguay 27% 54% 13% 53% 76%
Peru 80% 77% 67% 32% 47%
Dominican
Republic
67% 69% 40% 42% 76%
Uruguay 73% 85% 73% 58% 53%
Venezuela 80% 88% 60% 68% 82%
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Note: Scores above 70% are placed in bold.
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and eventually assisting individuals who fall outside of existing social security schemes and
government assistance programs (Blofield et al., 2020, pp. 7–8). It is also a region where the
government response to COVID-19 has been varied in nature and mixed in terms of effect-
iveness (Abers et al., 2021; Blofield et al., 2020).
Measuring the Dependent Variable: The Negative Health Impact of COVID
Our dependent variable is the number of COVID-19-based deaths (per million inhabi-
tants) in a country. Specifically, we use per capita mortality data from the end of the
first year of the pandemic (January 27, 2021) to ensure that the instances of collaboration,
where they occurred, took place before the identified mortality rate.
Our data for the dependent variable are imperfect. Underreporting has likely occurred
in many countries. If COVID-19 cases are underreported, then COVID-19-related deaths
are likely to be as well. The WHO recommends using excess mortality as an alternative,6
but these estimates are not available for all cases in our study – a point that restricts their
usability in this kind of analysis (Greer et al., 2020).
Our reasons for preferring mortality rates are multiple. For one, containing COVID-19
death rates was a primary goal during the first year of the pandemic and therefore a
measure of policy effectiveness. Government authorities used mortality rates early on
to plan additional health services and define future policy priorities (Muñoz, 2020).
Additionally, COVID-19-based mortality rates vary dramatically across the region.
Countries that are quite similar in socio-economic terms exhibit very different rates per
one million inhabitants. For example, in December 2020, the cumulative number of
COVID-19-based deaths in Argentina and Brazil was 956.8/million and 917.2/million,
respectively – roughly eighteen times the rate in Uruguay, at 52.1/million.
Finally, while not perfectly reliable, the total number of deaths per million
inhabitants attributed to COVID-19 is one of the best indicators of government perfor-
mance in addressing the disease (Lau et al., 2021).7 Overall patterns for this indicator
are relatively clear. We see collapsed healthcare systems and mass burials in some coun-
tries but not in others (Beech et al., 2020). Even with underestimation, some countries
(e.g. the United States, Brazil, and India) experienced far more deaths than others (e.g.
Argentina, Canada, or Australia). Finally, underreporting by some countries likely trun-
cates the variation on our dependent variable. Our results may be biased, but they are
likely to be biased away from a relationship between CG and mortality rates.
Our approach to measuring CG is also not without limitations. Our data are limited in
terms of capturing variation across time. We coded for instances of collaboration at three
different times during the first year of the pandemic: at the beginning, during the peak of
infections, and in early December 2020. Nevertheless, to maximise variation, we aggre-
gated all of these into a single score per country. Our case studies provide more insight
into over-time fluctuation in collaboration, especially in the case of Argentina. Future
research should include more information on the dynamics of CG over time.
Second, our data do not capture shifts in collaboration produced by a change in govern-
ment. In Bolivia, for example, a centre-left government with ties to social movements (Anria,
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2018) replaced a conservative, right-wing government. Given these ties, it is possible that the
second administration was collaborative inways that differed from the first. Nevertheless, we
coded the case using an average for the period. Finally, we identified at least one clear outlier,
Nicaragua, for which obtaining reliable informationwas a challenge.We excluded it from the
statistical analyses, although we maintain it in the descriptive statistics.
Methods
In the following pages, we undertake a novel approach to the study of CG. We rely on
data from an original database to undertake pairwise correlations between the different
dimensions of CG and COVID-19-based deaths. We also run a Student’s t-test
between each (dichotomous) question and the number of deaths from COVID-19 per
million inhabitants. We compare the average number of deaths in cases where the attri-
bute in question is present with cases in which it is absent.
These statistical tests provide a first cut at assessing the relationship between collaboration
and COVID-19-based mortality rates. We have a limited number of cases (18). Therefore, to
accompany the quantitative analysis, we undertake three case studies. These help assess the
extent to which collaboration, as coded in our dataset, was meaningful in practice. As we
show below, the cases of Brazil and Uruguay confirm theoretical expectations. They are
good testing grounds for the extent to which the observed correlation actually translates
into meaningful collaboration (Lieberman, 2005). A third case, Argentina, appears to contra-
dict theoretical expectations. It scores high on collaboration and also high on per capita mor-
tality rates by the end of the year. A deeper dive into the case demonstrates that changes in
collaboration over time bolster, rather than weaken, our quantitative findings. This final case
strengthens our results, as it is an apparent deviant case that, upon closer look, ultimately
aligns with our hypothesis (Seawright and Gerring, 2008).
To What Extent Does Collaboration Matter? A Quantitative
First Look
To analyse the impact of collaboration on COVID-19-based mortality rates, we must first
have a sense of how much collaboration there was in Latin America during the first year
of the pandemic. We created an overall score of collaboration for each country – what we
call a collaborative governance index (CGI). The CGI is the sum total of the dichotomous
coding of a battery of questions asked across all five dimensions of collaboration.8 The
maximum possible value of the index (summing up all positive responses) is fifty-five;
the minimum is zero. We calculated the Cronbach’s alpha statistic to analyse whether
the dimensions of the index are related to a single latent theoretical construct. The correl-
ation between all dimensions is 0.86, indicating that these dimensions are related.
Preliminary results suggest that there is quite a bit of variation with respect to the CGI
across all cases (Table 2). Several countries show higher values of CG. Chile (46) and
Argentina (45), followed by Honduras (43) and Uruguay (43), were the most
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collaborative in their policy responses to COVID-19. El Salvador, Brazil, and Nicaragua,
on the other hand, have the lowest scores. Nicaragua, which represents an outlier in our
dataset, received a total score of 1.9 Overall, Latin American countries varied in terms of
how much collaboration they sought with different sorts of actors during the first year of
the pandemic.
Table 1 demonstrates how each country fared with respect to each of the five dimen-
sions of collaboration. Here, the maximum score possible for each dimension is based on
the number of questions asked about each type of collaboration.10
Interesting patterns emerge regarding variation across collaboration types. For
example, at the most general level, countries tended to score high or low across all dimen-
sions. Many countries scored at 70% or higher (e.g. Argentina, Bolivia, Chile,
Honduras, Uruguay), while others never attained that percentage (Brazil, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Nicaragua). Corporate CG is an exception to this rule. Countries exhibit
Table 2. Collaborative Governance Index.
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Note: Maximum possible score is 55.
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relatively high levels of collaboration with the private sector. Ecuador, alternatively, col-
laborated most with independent scientists and experts. It scored towards the middle or
bottom on other dimensions.
There is no clear relationship between different types of governments and collaboration.
For example, some federal countries, like Argentina, scored high (14/15, or 93 per cent) in
terms of inter-governmental CG – a “natural” choice for collaboration in such a political
system. In Mexico and Brazil, by contrast, collaboration with subnational governments
was much lower (53 per cent and 40 per cent, respectively). Left-wing and right-wing gov-
ernments also vary in terms of collaboration. Chile and Argentina pursued the most collab-
oration (46 and 45, respectively, on theCGI scale). Chile’s president, Sebastián Piñera, sits on
the centre-right; Argentina’s, Alberto Fernández, sits on the centre-left.
The extent of collaboration across these countries is somewhat surprising given the
near-universal need, early on in the pandemic, to respond quickly. Collaboration takes
time (Ansell and Gash, 2008). These findings also challenge the conclusion that Latin
America is a region where, generally speaking, “governance is not sufficiently collabora-
tive and innovative in designing democratically responsible solutions to complex
twenty-first-century problems” (Rodriguez, 2019, p. 5). Collaboration is a choice that
at least some countries made.
To what extent has collaboration mattered? We hypothesise that, in countries where
national governments collaborate more, the negative health impact of COVID-19
should be reduced. As an initial test of this hypothesis, and due to a limited number of
cases (18), we produce a scatterplot of cases based on the two key variables (see Figure 1).
Figure 1 presents mixed results. Some countries, such as Uruguay, Honduras, and the
Dominican Republic, conform to expectations: They have high values on the CGI with
lower COVID-19-related deaths. So, too, does Brazil in the opposite quadrant, with a low
CGI score and high death rates. By contrast, Argentina and Chile scored high on the CGI
but also experienced high death rates. El Salvador has a low CGI score and also a compara-
tively low death rate. These results suggest that there is only a weak relationship between the
CGI and the number of deaths attributed to COVID-19.11 The correlation between the vari-
ables is low and statistically insignificant, but it is negative (r = −0.10).
Next, we broke down this correlation into the different dimensions of CG. There is no
correlation between institutional CG and per capita COVID-based deaths.12
Nevertheless, t-test results associated with specific policy areas are suggestive. For
example, where inter-governmental bureaucracies collaborated on quarantine policy,
average death rates were lower than in the absence of collaboration (653/million vs.
1123/million, p = 0.01).
There is no correlation between CG of science and technology and deaths rates either.
We do find a negative (r = −0.25) relationship between corporate CG and per capita
deaths and between inter-governmental CG and per capita deaths (r = −0.22), but
they are not statistically significant (see Figure 2). Nevertheless, the t-test indicates
that the number of COVID-19-related deaths/million tends to be lower in countries
where there was inter-governmental CG. In these cases, the average number of deaths
was 578/million, compared to 857/million where there was no collaboration (p= 0.1).
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The average number of deaths was also lower when there were regular meetings between
officials of the national and sub-national bureaucracies (366/million) versus when there
were no meetings (759/million) (p= 0.07).
The correlation is stronger and within the upper limits of statistical significance with
social CG (r = −0.35; p= 0.1). The t-test appears to confirm that deaths tended to
decrease when there was social CG. This was true in the case of collaboration with
social organisations (577/million in the presence of collaboration; 788/million in its
absence; p= 0.1) and also with unions (575/million with collaboration vs. 1142/
million without; p= 0.02). This finding is consistent with existing literature, which
finds that social organisations can positively influence government policymaking
(Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Andrews, 2001; Soule and Olzak, 2004), including with
respect to COVID-19 responses (Abers et al., 2021).
More specifically, when social organisations collaborated on detection, the number of
deaths tended to decrease more substantially compared to where there was no collabor-
ation: 336/million on average versus 864/million (p= 0.01). This kind of collaboration
occurred in Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Where social orga-
nisations collaborated with vaccine distribution and vaccination, the number of deaths
tended to decrease as well: 493/million with collaboration versus 839/million without
Figure 1. CGI and deaths from COVID-19 (per million inhabitants), eighteen countries. Source:
Author’s compilation.
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(p= 0.02). This kind of collaboration occurred in Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The number of
deaths also tended to decrease when there was social collaboration at the beginning
(647 vs. 1111; p= 0.08) and at the peak of the pandemic (506 vs. 951; p= 0.02).
Overall, our dataset represents the first attempt to measure collaboration and explore
its incidence across a set of countries. We have data on a quite limited number of cases.
Gathering information on collaboration is time-consuming and information about it is
elusive. Despite these limitations, our measures of CG suggest that there was consider-
able variation in the countries of the sample. This is an important finding and contributes
to our understanding of how governments decide to address a complex problem like the
COVID-19 pandemic.
Our initial analyses and their preliminary results also indicate that, where there was
more collaboration, the number of deaths attributed to COVID-19 tended to be lower.
This was the case, for example, where there were regular meetings between national
and subnational government officials. This trend is clearest where there was inter-
governmental and social CG. The t-tests confirm that when social organisations
Figure 2. Relationship between COVID-related deaths per million inhabitants and
inter-governmental CG (I), social CG (II), and corporate CG (III). Source: Authors’ compilation.
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collaborated on detection, vaccine distribution, and vaccination, the number of deaths
tended to decrease more substantially compared to where there was no collaboration.
In all, the data suggest that collaboration can help address the enormous challenges
that the pandemic generates. Case studies allow us to examine these findings in more
detail.
To What Extent Does Collaboration (Really) Matter? An
Examination of Three Cases
Above we found initial evidence of a relationship between collaboration, and especially
social and inter-governmental collaboration, and a reduction of COVID-19-related
deaths. However, the small number of cases prevented us from controlling for other
factors. Additionally, some countries experienced high levels of deaths despite high
levels of collaboration.
We carry out brief case studies of Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina to dig a little deeper
into the hypothesised relationship between collaboration and COVID-19-related deaths.
In the first year of the pandemic, Uruguay had high levels of collaboration and low death
rates (Figure 1). Brazil scored low in terms of collaboration and had much higher death
rates. Argentina, by contrast, had one of the highest levels of collaboration but also very
high death rates. It is a potentially confounding case that merits further investigation.
High on Collaboration, Low on COVID-19-Related Deaths: The Case of Uruguay
After the first case of COVID-19 was detected in Uruguay, President Luis Lacalle Pou, a
conservative president and “fervent believer in personal freedom” (Parks, 2021), insti-
tuted a rather severe lockdown (Moreno et al., 2020). The government made confinement
voluntary. Nevertheless, 90 per cent of the population complied with the rules and stayed
home (BBC News Mundo, 2020).
The lockdown gave the government time to develop a series of technological measures
to monitor and control contagion. The resulting system, called Coronavirus.uy, made the
country’s health services available to citizens via a mobile app. The app helped with
tracking, allowed for self-monitoring, and also provided a channel for telemedicine.
Uruguay was the first country in Latin America to incorporate exposure notifications
(Milano et al., 2020, p. 53).
Collaboration almost certainly had a hand to play in the containment of
COVID-19-related deaths in Uruguay. For one, the government worked with the scien-
tific community (Moreno et al., 2020, p. 4) and more than thirty public and private com-
panies to design and implement the software (Milano et al., 2020, p. 54). These
stakeholders worked quickly. In the two months following the first detected case, the
system was accessed more than 2.6 million times in a country with a total population
of 3.5 million people (Milano et al., 2020, p. 54).
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The government also developed its own testing kit, allowing Uruguay to outper-
form other countries on COVID-19 testing. At one point, it had “tested 233.7
people for every confirmed case of COVID-19, compared with 1.7 in Argentina,
1.9 in Mexico, and 3 in Colombia” (Taylor, 2020, p. 1). The kits were created
within a COVID-19 diagnostic lab network created in a matter of weeks with the
help of research institutes, hospitals, and academic laboratories throughout the
country (Taylor, 2020, pp. 1–2).
Overall, CG in science and technology and institutional CG were important to the
Uruguayan response early on. This conforms with Table 1, where Uruguay scores high
on both dimensions (73 per cent and 85 per cent, respectively).13 These stakeholders pro-
vided expertise, infrastructure, and resources to respond quickly to the pandemic. Indeed,
they came together within days of the first identified case. The agreement they forged
early on was nearly “perfect” (Taylor, 2020, p. 1), setting the stage for a coordinated
response.
Uruguay’s early steps in tracking, monitoring, and notification were largely success-
ful. By the end of the year, thanks to the “unprecedented alignment” of decision makers,
scientists, and academics, the country had succeeded in reducing the virus’ spread
(Anarte, 2020). The total number of COVID-19-related deaths was 52/million. By way
of comparison, Argentina had 956 and Brazil had 917 deaths per million (ourworldinda-
ta.org). Uruguay’s relatively low death rate is especially impressive given that the country
has one of the oldest populations in the region – a group that is particularly susceptible to
the worst effects of COVID-19 (Saldías, 2020). Overall, many hailed Uruguay as an
exceptional success story in Latin America.
Despite this success, a catastrophic surge in COVID-19 cases and deaths emerged in
the second year. Why, in April 2021, did Uruguay face a “world-record COVID-19 infec-
tion rate” (Medical Express, 2021)? Several different factors likely led to the dramatic
reversal. First, Uruguay borders Brazil, where one of the more contagious variants of
the virus emerged. Second, citizen fatigue with the restrictions of pandemic life undoubt-
edly set in. Finally, President Lacalle refused to further restrict mobility in light of the
growing number of cases, calling instead on personal responsibility. He ignored calls
from experts – including some with whom he had collaborated to develop the online
health portal (Lissardy, 2021). Rather than continue to collaborate with experts on
policy, he deliberately excluded them.
Low on Collaboration, High on COVID-19-Related Deaths: The Case of Brazil
Generally speaking, Brazil’s constitutional design is oriented toward promoting federal
coordination. This institutional feature should facilitate inter-governmental collaboration.
Rather than work with regional and municipal governments, however, President Jair
Bolsonaro centralised power (Abrucio et al., 2020). Consequently, when the pandemic
hit, the administration’s relationship with other governmental stakeholders was “increas-
ingly tense” (Abers et al., 2021, p. 5; Rodrigues and Azevedo, 2020).
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The differences between pandemic policymaking in Uruguay and Brazil were stark. In
Uruguay, the president worked collaboratively with different stakeholders from the onset
of the pandemic. Bolsonaro, by contrast, refused to work with other actors.14
Inter-institutional conflict, for example, between the national government and other
key ministries made addressing the pandemic very difficult. In April 2020, Bolsonaro
fired his Health Minister, Luiz Henrique Mandetta. The Minister had recommended
that citizens voluntarily quarantine – a measure that specifically contradicted
Bolsonaro’s message to the public (Rodrigues et al., 2020, p. 628; Kamlot and Santos
Vieira de Jesus, 2020). The new minister, Nelson Teich, initially stated that he was
aligned with the president (Kamlot and Santos Vieira de Jesus, 2020). Nevertheless, he
quit just one month later, in May 2020, after refusing to endorse the use of hydroxychlor-
oquine (Gazeta do Povo, 2020). In line with these events, Brazil has the second-lowest
score in Table 1 for institutional CG (35 per cent).
Additionally, rather than collaborate with subnational governments on a coordinated
response to COVID-19, Bolsonaro sowed conflict. He called on Brazilians to ignore shut-
down mandates emanating from subnational governments and go back to work (Lopes,
2020; Phillips, 2020). In one case, he issued a statement against the self-isolation and
business closure measures that governors in Rio de Janeiro and elsewhere mandated.
In support of Bolsonaro, the mayor of Rio de Janeiro, Marcelo Crivella, re-opened
local business. Immediately following this move, the governor, Wilson Witzel, inter-
vened and reversed Crivella’s decision. In the absence of inter-governmental collabor-
ation, mixed messages over the shutdown measures prevailed, sowing confusion
amongst the population, who were unsure about whose authority to follow (Rodrigues
and Azevedo, 2020, p. 3).
Bolsonaro was adamantly against the more stringent measures of social distancing, the
closing of non-essential businesses and schools, and the cancellation of large public gath-
erings. Nevertheless, Brazil’s federal structure gave regional and local governments the
authority to issue such measures (Kamlot and Santos Vieira de Jesus, 2020). These
were taken by Bolsonaro “as an insurrection against the federal government”
(Cheatham, 2020). Eventually, twenty-six out of the twenty-seven Brazilian governors
met without the president and agreed on a joint strategy for combating the virus
(Kamlot and Santos Vieira de Jesus, 2020).
Ultimately, the national executive chose not to heed the states’ call for stronger actions
against COVID-19. Consequently, the states struggled to coordinate their own efforts.
For example, without national coordination over the distribution of medical equipment
and other resources, states ended up competing over the limited pool of supplies
(Abrucio et al., 2020, p. 672). Rather than address inequalities across states, the pandemic
exacerbated them.
A “broad-based anti-Bolsonaro coalition from centre-right to left” was formed to
protest the president’s inaction and also press for change (Abers et al., 2021, p. 8).
Unlike in Argentina, as we will see below, these movements were excluded from
talks over pandemic policy. Indeed, Bolsonaro’s success in sowing doubt over
the virus meant that, rather than press for longer-term pandemic solutions, social
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movements spent their energy convincing citizens that the pandemic actually consti-
tuted a threat. Their capacity to demand change, consequently, was limited (Abers
et al., 2021).
Overall, Bolsonaro’s administration chose not to collaborate with potentially powerful
state and non-state actors. Its strategy was one of denial and minimisation in the name of
preserving economic growth, and its model of confrontation was strengthened (Abrucio
et al., 2020, p. 670). These findings reflect Brazil’s performance in Table 1, where it has
the fifth-lowest score out of eighteen for inter-governmental CG and social CG, and the
second-lowest score on institutional CG and CG in science and technology.
Ultimately, despite a rising number of cases and deaths, state and local governments
felt enormous pressure to re-open the economy. In June 2020, most subnational govern-
ments began to lift restrictions (Abers et al., 2021, p. 5). By August, the Public Policy
Adoption Index of the COVID-19 Observatory at the University of Miami found that
Brazil only fared better than Haiti and Nicaragua when it came to fighting the pandemic
(Abers et al., 2021, p. 5). Case counts and deaths per million rose exponentially. On
June 1, 2020, the number of confirmed cases in Brazil was 2,476 per million. By
August 1, it was more than five times higher, at 12,739. Its confirmed number of
deaths was 140.8/million on June 1, and nearly three times as great, at 440.7/million,
in August.15
Differences between Uruguay and Brazil in their COVID-19 response were stark in the
first year. Uruguay sought out and leveraged the expertise and knowledge of different stake-
holders to implement a system to inform citizens about disease testing, tracking, and moni-
toring. The collaborative effort produced a single (online) site where any Uruguayan could
receive information. Bolsonaro’s refusal to work with other actors to address the pandemic
made enacting successful containment strategies more difficult. States competed, rather
than cooperated, over resources. Mixed messages sowed confusion amongst the population.
Debates “raged” on social media over whether people should stay home (Kamlot and Santos
de Vieira de Jesus, 2020, p. 40). Without the federal government’s acknowledgement of the
seriousness of the virus, social movements struggled to mobilise support for their demands.
Overall, efforts were divided. Containment, as a consequence, was more difficult to achieve.
High on Collaboration, High on COVID-19-Related Deaths: The Case of
Argentina
At first glance, Argentina’s experience with collaboration directly contradicts our expec-
tations. It is one of the highest performers in terms of CGI, but it has one of the highest
death rates in the dataset (Figure 1). Here, we examine Argentina’s over-time experience
with COVID-19. We show that the government was in fact highly collaborative early on
in the first year, when the country’s case and death rates were among the lowest in the
world. Yet, collaboration – and especially inter-governmental collaboration – broke
down several months into the pandemic. By the end of the first year, when we coded mor-
tality rates, deaths had skyrocketed.
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Alberto Fernández assumed power just months before the first COVID-19 case was
detected. His administration faced debilitating debt, high inflation, and an increas-
ingly polarised political system (Abers et al., 2021, p. 8). Collaboration, and espe-
cially inter-governmental collaboration, was not a given. Nevertheless, Fernández
chose to work with multiple actors – including scientists, social organisations, and
governors – from early on to develop a pandemic response. Part of this response
involved utilising existing collaborative institutions and relationships. For example,
the executive relied heavily on the Federal Council for Healthcare (COFESA in
Spanish), a public agency created in 1981 to: help coordinate public health in the
country, design a system for acquiring and distributing medicine and devices,
create an online program for identifying and tracing cases, called DetactAr, and
coordinate an integrated health database. The most important health measures were
decided in collaboration with this institution (Bianchi, forthcoming, p. 7). In line
with this finding, Argentina was the second-highest scorer in terms of institutional
CG (92 per cent, see Table 1).
The government also turned to scientists and social movements to craft policy. Indeed,
these stakeholders had already been incorporated into key government Ministries.
Fernández’s governing coalition was collaborative in nature. Nevertheless, key social
movement leaders, including from the Confederation of Popular Economic Workers
(CTEP) and the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, gained leverage and influence as the pan-
demic advanced. They sought to ensure that vulnerable populations could access
pandemic-based relief. In harnessing the support of social leaders, the government also
mobilised the support of their broader movements, especially for the strict lockdown
that was imposed in March 2020 (Abers et al., 2021, pp. 9–10). Social collaboration
was integral to the government’s initial pandemic response; it is the third-highest perfor-
mer (79 per cent) on this dimension in Table 1.
Fernández also collaborated with governors and other actors outside of the
COFESA framework. For example, his administration, together with the provincial
government of Córdoba, negotiated with a company to distribute ventilators domes-
tically rather than export them. The government also worked with the provinces to
craft a ventilator distribution plan, so as to “avoid competition among provinces
over equipment” (Bianchi, forthcoming, p. 7). Additionally, emergency responses
to distribute food, supplies, and protective equipment to the poor were crafted in con-
junction with municipal and provincial governments and social movements and orga-
nisations (Díaz Langou et al., 2020, p. 19). Collaboration with governors was also
important for the country; its score is the highest on this dimension (93 per cent,
see Table 1).
Overall, the federal government sought out and collaborated with multiple differ-
ent actors to address the pandemic early on. The country’s collaborative response
during the first months of the pandemic gave it time to build hospitals, double the
number of beds, and utilise the growing knowledge about the disease to prepare for
a potential future spike in cases (Bianchi, forthcoming, p. 2). Collaboration with sub-
national government was paramount since the country’s federal structure gives
Cyr et al. 19
provinces autonomy over delivering healthcare. As mentioned above, Argentina’s
case numbers and death rates remained among the lowest in the world during the
first months.
The country’s federal structure eventually worked against Fernández as the strict lock-
down he imposed – with the support of the opposition16 – neared its fourth month. Given
the nature of its federal system, the power of the Argentine presidency is defined in great
part by subnational coalitional support (Ardanaz et al., 2014). When that support is lost, a
president’s capacity to coordinate national policy falters.
This happened towards the end of June when part of the opposition began to openly
resist the federal government. Multiple factors likely produced the breakdown in collab-
oration. For one, early containment may have created a false sense of security amongst
the population.17 A relatively low case count, together with growing citizen fatigue
and an economic crisis exacerbated by the lockdown, made consensus over the lockdown
increasingly costly for the opposition. Additionally, the government moved to expropri-
ate Vicentín, one of the country’s leading agricultural companies that had filed for bank-
ruptcy in late 2019. The stated goal was to rescue the company and protect employees and
associated farmers. Opponents publicly condemned the move, drawing parallels with
Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (Dube, 2020).
On June 20, 2020, the opposition organised the first of many national protests against
the administration. Argentines came out in droves holding signs that said, “Save the
Republic,” “Save democracy,” and “No to Argenzuela.” Prominent opposition leaders
lambasted the president. By September 2020, the president’s support – which had
reached 90 per cent in the first month of the pandemic – dropped to just over 50 per
cent (Bianchi, forthcoming).
With the breakdown of inter-governmental collaboration and mounting pressure to
act, Fernández ended up loosening lockdown restrictions and re-opening the
economy.18 The impact was nearly immediate. Confirmed cases peaked at a weekly
average of 333/million in October (on June 1, the weekly average was 15.13 cases/
million). Confirmed deaths grew from 12.3/million on June 1 to 958/million by the
end of the year (Our World in Data). Nevertheless, the healthcare system was able to
absorb the growing caseload. At least through the end of January 2021, and despite
having the eleventh highest death rate in the world, Argentine’s healthcare system did
not collapse (Bianchi, forthcoming).
Overall, the collaboration between the federal government and other stakeholders,
and especially governors, shifted quite dramatically roughly four months into the
pandemic. Collaboration was high early on. As a result, governors cooperated,
rather than competed, over existing resources. Collaboration bought time for
the federal government to procure more resources, especially in terms of hospitals
and hospital beds. When the surge occurred in the second half of the year, the
country was prepared. Nevertheless, cases and deaths surged in the months after
collaboration broke down. Rather than confound our hypothesis, Argentina’s year-
long battle with the pandemic provides further evidence of the importance of
collaboration.
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Conclusions
In this paper, we sought to examine the impact collaboration has on COVID-19-related
deaths. The quantitative data provided initial, suggestive evidence that collaboration
matters for preventing the worst health outcomes. Inter-governmental and social collab-
oration, in particular, were salient dimensions of collaboration.
The case studies reinforced these findings. Brazil was a negative case of collaboration.
The Bolsonaro government excluded social movements and conflicted openly with gov-
ernors. Consequently, Brazilian states competed for resources; citizens received mixed
messages regarding the seriousness of the virus; and social movements struggled to mobi-
lise citizens. The Uruguayan and Argentine governments sought collaboration from the
outset. The former leveraged the knowledge and experience of independent scientists
and public and private institutions. The latter worked with governors and other state insti-
tutions to forge consensus over the imposed lockdown, and it directly incorporated social
movements and scientists into its governing coalition. Uruguay and Argentina were suc-
cessful in containing deaths early on; Brazil, by contrast, struggled. In Argentina, after
inter-governmental collaboration broke down, the country’s caseload and deaths per
capita surged.
We also uncovered mechanisms through which collaboration helped reduce the negative
health impacts of COVID-19. Non-state actors in Uruguay and Argentina provided national
executiveswith access to unique expertise and experience. The collaboration allowed govern-
ments to pool from other stakeholders the resources they lacked. Collaborationmay also have
made policies easier to understand. Citizens received mixed messages in Brazil about how to
prevent the spread of COVID-19, sowing uncertainty about the proper course of action.
Finally, collaboration helped produce policies for sharing, rather than competing, over
resources, especially among subnational governments.
Collaboration can be dynamic, as Uruguay and Argentina demonstrate, and there is no
reason it must endure. Indeed, Uruguay’s president sought collaboration early on in
response to the pandemic. When, however, independent experts recommended a stricter
lockdown policy, Lacalle chose not to listen. Collaboration may only last to the extent
that collaborative mechanisms are institutionalised, so that the whims of any one indivi-
dual do not supersede broader goals. This point is especially salient in Latin America,
where state institutions have historically been politicised.
Finally, we measured the collaborative efforts of national governments in addressing
COVID-19. Yet, collaboration need not emanate from the national executive, nor must it
necessarily include it. Local government leaders, in collaboration with other local stake-
holders, may craft policies that, while more limited in extension, can be effective
(Bennouna et al., 2020).
The pandemic rages on in Latin America. Government responses will evolve. Our
research suggests that collaboration shaped early responses to COVID-19. But questions
about CG remain. Defining the scope, nature, and limitations of collaboration, both for
the pandemic as well as for other “wicked” problems in the region, remain fruitful
avenues for future research.
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Notes
1. Right-wing populist leaders, like Bolsonaro or Trump, may, alternatively, refuse to impose
strict stay-at-home policies due to the political and economic costs associated with keeping
mobile societies/workers at home. One proxy for mobility is the level of informality of the
economy in question. Individuals that work odd jobs, are undocumented, and/or shift from
one paid job to another are very likely to be highly mobile within large urban settings. The
enforcement of stay-at-home measures severely restricts their capacity to work. The costs to
their livelihood, in other words, are very high. The refusal to impose strict confinement policies
may correspond to these costs. Yet, the data on informality do not line up with these expecta-
tions. Our World in Data shows that Argentina has a higher rate of informal employment (as a
percentage of total non-agricultural employment) than Brazil and Uruguay (46.79 per cent,
37.79 per cent, and 22.95 per cent, respectively, in 2014). Yet, Argentina imposed much
more stringent confinement policies than Brazil early on (Bennouna et al., 2020). Certain popu-
list policy preferences do not appear to explain the adoption of policies associated with lower
COVID-19-based mortality rates.
2. Uruguay’s pandemic numbers rose dramatically in the second year of the pandemic. We con-
sider these changes in more detail below.
3. Collaboration is different from cooperation or coordination. Cooperation, or the absence of
conflict, is less formal, less risky, and involves sharing information in the short-term.
Coordination is the organisation of people towards a particular goal. It involves more formal
and longer-term interaction, increased risk, and shared rewards. With collaboration, resources
are mutually shared. Stakeholders build upon and share capital, expertise, and experience in
pursuit of shared goals (Bryson et al., 2006: pp. 55–7).
4. Burgeoning research suggests that collaboration occurs across different political settings,
including authoritarian and democratic regimes and federal and unitary systems (Liu et al.,
2021).
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5. A country received a 0 if there were no meetings; 1 if the meetings occurred less than once a
month; and 2 if the meetings occurred at least once a month.
6. See https://www.who.int/data/stories/the-true-death-toll-of-covid-19-estimating-global-
excess-mortality
7. Our work also aligns with existing research (Azerrat et al., 2021; Cepaluni et al., 2020) that
uses the same dependent variable.
8. We included eight questions for each dimension, for a total of nine points (a question on fre-
quency of meetings has a maximum of two points). Social CG has a maximum of ten, since it
measures collaboration with social organisations (one point) and unions (one point). The insti-
tutional dimension of CG is divided into inter-administrative (collaboration amongst national
ministries) and inter-bureaucratic (collaboration among national and subnational bureaucra-
cies) collaboration, adding up to eighteen points (nine points for each). See Appendix 1 for
further details.
9. We also doubt the level of collaboration in Venezuela, given the biased nature of the data pro-
duced in the authoritarian country. On this point, see Vyas and Dube (2021).
10. See Appendix 1 for the full questionnaire and the questions used to create the CGI.
11. We also fit a quadratic line with the data, indicating that the relationship between the two vari-
ables may not be linear (see Figure 3b, Appendix 2). Further research may explore this connec-
tion, ideally in a larger sample of cases.
12. These figures are available in Appendix 2.
13. With respect to CG in science and technology, Uruguay is second in the table behind Ecuador.
14. Bolsonaro minimized the seriousness of the pandemic. He called it a “little flu” and argued
against social distancing and other recommendations to contain the virus’ spread (Kamlot
and Santos Vieira de Jesus, 2020).
15. To compare, Uruguay’s confirmed cases were 237.5/million on June 1, and 367.9/million on
August 1. Confirmed numbers of deaths per million were 6.62/million on June 1, and 10.1/
million on August 1.
16. Opposition leaders declared their total support for Fernández, as their “commander,” in the first
days of the lockdown (Infobae, 2020).
17. Early success with containment may be a pyrrhic victory for governments. Citizens feel con-
strained by strict lockdown measures and, in the absence of numerous cases, may question the
logic of continued stringency. Pressures to re-open may mount. More social interaction,
however, could produce the spike in cases that lockdown had prevented.
18. He also retracted his intended plan to expropriate Vicentín.
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Appendix 1: Questionnaire Used for Measuring Collaboration
across Different Dimensions, as well as Newspaper Sources
Used for Coding
In the following pages, we provide a series of tables. Tables 3 and 4 list the questions we
used to code levels of collaboration across the five dimensions. Table 5 provides the
breakdown of the CGI, and Table 6 provides the score per country. Finally, Table 7 pro-
vides a list of all of the newspaper sources utilised to code across the questions in the first
tables.
Below is the questionnaire used to measure the extent to which there was collaboration
across the five different dimensions of CG. In brief, each dimension refers to the
following:
1. Inter-governmental CG, or collaboration with regional governments and espe-
cially the executive office at the regional (i.e. state, province, region) level.
2. Institutional CG, which includes two variants: (a) administrative, or collaboration
amongst different national ministries, and (b) inter-bureaucratic, or collaboration
across national and subnational bureaucracies.
3. CG in science and technology, or collaboration with independent scientists and
health experts.
4. Social CG, or collaboration with social organisations and/or unions.
5. Corporate CG, or collaboration with private enterprise.
The questions in bold were the questions used to create the CGI.
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Table 3. Full Questionnaire.
Questions for each Dimension of Collaborative Governance Possible Responses
(1) Inter-Governmental CG (15 questions; 15 points
possible)
¿Hubo planificación de las políticas y cooperación en
la implementación/seguimiento/evaluación entre
gobiernos nacional y provinciales para definir las
políticas en relación a la pandemia?
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Política sanitaria: definiciones sobre la cuarentena
general
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Política sanitaria: Políticas de detección Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Política sanitaria: Organización de vacunación y
distribución de vacunas
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Política educativa: definición de cierre y reapertura
escolar
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Políticas de transferencia de ingreso/Protección de
empleo/Subsidios
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Políticas en relación a la violencia de género contra la
mujer
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Las reuniones fueron regulares o esporádicas? (1 mensual es regular)
Regulares = 2/Esporádicas = 1/
Ninguna = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Hubo reuniones al comienzo de la pandemia? Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Hubo reuniones en el pico de la pandemia? Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Hubo reuniones hasta la actualidad? Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Hubo conflicto entre el Ejecutivo Nacional y los Ejecutivos
subnacionales a lo largo de la pandemia?
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Participaron oficialistas solamente Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Participaron oficialistas y opositores Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Qué porcentaje de los gobernadores participaron? Porcentaje (%)
(2) Institutional Collaborative Governance (25 questions; 26 points possible
2a. Administrative CG
¿Hubo instancias institucionalizadas de planificación
de las políticas y cooperación en la
implementación/seguimiento/evaluación en el
nivel nacional, e.g. entre ministerios?
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Las reuniones fueron regulares o esporádicas? (1 mensual es regular)
Regulares = 2/Esporádicas = 1/
Ninguna = 0/No sabe = 88
Política sanitaria: definiciones sobre la cuarentena
general
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Política sanitaria: Políticas de detección Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
(Continued)
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Table 3. Continued
Questions for each Dimension of Collaborative Governance Possible Responses
Política sanitaria: Organización de vacunación y
distribución de vacunas
Política educativa: definición de cierre y reapertura
escolar
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Políticas de transferencia de ingreso/Protección de
empleo/Subsidios
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Políticas en relación a la violencia de género contra la
mujer
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Hubo reuniones al comienzo de la pandemia? Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Hubo reuniones en el pico de la pandemia? Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Hubo reuniones hasta la actualidad? Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Hubo conflicto entre las Administraciones a lo largo de la
pandemia?
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
2b. Inter-bureaucratic CG
¿Hubo planificación de las políticas y cooperación en
la implementación/seguimiento/evaluación entre
funcionarios de la burocracia nacional con
funcionarios de las burocracias subnacionales?
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Las reuniones fueron regulares o esporádicas? (1 mensual es regular)
Regulares = 2/Esporádicas
= 1/Ninguna = 0/No sabe =
88
¿Qué porcentaje de las unidades subnacionales participaron? Porcentaje (%)
Política sanitaria: definiciones sobre la cuarentena
general
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Política sanitaria: Políticas de detección Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Política sanitaria: Organización de vacunación y
distribución de vacunas
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Política educativa: definición de cierre y reapertura
escolar
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Políticas de transferencia de ingreso/Protección de
empleo/Subsidios
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Políticas en relación a la violencia de género contra la
mujer
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Hubo reuniones al comienzo de la pandemia? Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Hubo reuniones en el pico de la pandemia? Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Hubo reuniones hasta la actualidad? Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Hubo conflicto entre las burocracias nacionales y
subnacionales a lo largo de la pandemia?
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
(3) CG in Science and Technology (17 questions; 15 points possible)
¿Hubo instancias de planificación de las políticas y Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
(Continued)
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Table 3. Continued
Questions for each Dimension of Collaborative Governance Possible Responses
cooperación en la implementación/seguimiento/
evaluación con especialistas en salud y científicos
con representantes del gabinete del gobierno
nacional?
¿Se conformó un equipo científico de apoyo al ejecutivo? Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Si existe, ¿quienes lo conforman? (sociales-humanidades,
biología-salud, exactas-naturales,
agrarias-tecnología)
¿Participaron legisladores (nacionales, provinciales o locales)? Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Las reuniones fueron regulares o esporádicas? (1 mensual es regular)
Regulares = 2/Esporádicas = 1/
Ninguna = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Hubo metodologías de participación? Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Cuales? Libre
Los especialistas en salud y científicos, ¿formaron parte de las
entregas de información de prensa?
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Hubo reuniones con especialistas en salud y científicos con
representantes del gabinete del gobierno provincial o
municipal?
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Qué porcentaje de las unidades subnacionales participaron? Porcentaje (%)
Política sanitaria: definiciones sobre la cuarentena
general
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Política sanitaria: Políticas de detección Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Política sanitaria: Organización de vacunación y
distribución de vacunas
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Política educativa: definición de cierre y reapertura
escolar
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Políticas de transferencia de ingreso/Protección de
empleo/Subsidios
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Políticas en relación a la violencia de género contra la
mujer
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Hubo conflictos entre el gobierno nacional y el comité de
expertos/científicos/etc?
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
(4) Social CG (17 questions; 19 points possible)
¿Hubo instancias de planificación de las políticas y
cooperación en la implementación/seguimiento/
evaluación entre representantes de
organizaciones sociales y del gabinete del gobierno
nacional?
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Hubo instancias de planificación de las políticas y
cooperación en la implementacin/seguimiento/
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
(Continued)
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Table 3. Continued
Questions for each Dimension of Collaborative Governance Possible Responses
evaluación entre representantes de SINDICATOS
y del gabinete del gobierno nacional?
¿Las reuniones entre el ejecutivo nacional y las
organizaciones sociales fueron regulares o esporádicas?
(1 mensual es regular)
Regulares = 2/Esporádicas = 1/
Ninguna = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Participaron legisladores (nacionales, provinciales o locales)? Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Hubo reuniones entre representantes de organizaciones
sociales y del gabinete del gobierno provincial o municipal?
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Las reuniones entre los ejecutivos provinciales y las
organizaciones sociales fueron regulares o esporádicas?
(1 mensual es regular)
Regulares = 2/Esporádicas = 1/
Ninguna = 0/No sabe = 88
Estas organizaciones, ¿representaban a distintas provincias
del interior?
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Política sanitaria: definiciones sobre la cuarentena
general
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Política sanitaria: Políticas de detección Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Política sanitaria: Organización de vacunación y
distribución de vacunas
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Política educativa: definición de cierre y reapertura
escolar
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Políticas de transferencia de ingreso/Protección de
empleo/Subsidios
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Políticas en relación a la violencia de género contra la
mujer
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Hubo reuniones al comienzo de la pandemia? Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Hubo reuniones en el pico de la pandemia? Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Hubo reuniones hasta la actualidad? Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Hubo conflicto entre el gobierno nacional y las
organizaciones sociales a lo largo de la pandemia?
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
(5) Corporate CG (17 questions; 17 points possible)
¿Hubo instancias de planificación de las políticas y
mecanismos de cooperación publico/privado entre
representantes de las empresas privadas y del
gabinete del gobierno nacional?
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Las reuniones fueron regulares o esporádicas? (1 mensual es regular)
Regulares = 2/Esporádicas
= 1/Ninguna = 0/No sabe =
88
¿Hubo reuniones entre representantes de las empresas
privadas y del gabinete del gobierno provincial o
municipal?
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
(Continued)
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Table 3. Continued
Questions for each Dimension of Collaborative Governance Possible Responses
¿Participaron legisladores (nacionales, provinciales o locales)? Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Hubo colaboración por parte de las principales empresas de
medios audiovisuales?
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Estas empresas, ¿representaban a distintas unidades
subnacionales?
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Qué porcentaje de las unidades subnacionales estaban
representadas por las empresas?
Porcentaje (%)
Política sanitaria: definiciones sobre la cuarentena
general
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Política sanitaria: Políticas de detección Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Política sanitaria: Organización de vacunación y
distribución de vacunas
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Política educativa: definición de cierre y reapertura
escolar
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Políticas de transferencia de ingreso/Protección de
empleo/Subsidios
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
Políticas en relación a la violencia de género contra la
mujer
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Hubo reuniones al comienzo de la pandemia? Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Hubo reuniones en el pico de la pandemia? Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Hubo reuniones hasta la actualidad? Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
¿Hubo conflictos entre el gobierno nacional y los
empresarios a lo largo de la pandemia?
Si = 1/No = 0/No sabe = 88
In the next table, you will find the questions that were included in the CGI score. They were emboldened in the
table above, but we have copied them here for ease of reading.
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Table 4. Questions From the Questionnaire Used to Create the CGI Score
Questions for Each Dimension of CG Scores
Inter-governmental CG Maximum score: 9
¿Hubo planificación de las políticas y cooperación en la implementación/
seguimiento/evaluación entre gobiernos nacional y provinciales para
definir las políticas en relación a la pandemia?
1
Política sanitaria: definiciones sobre la cuarentena general 1
Política sanitaria: Políticas de detección 1
Política sanitaria: Organización de vacunación y distribución de vacunas 1
Política educativa: definición de cierre y reapertura escolar 1
Políticas de transferencia de ingreso/Protección de empleo/Subsidios 1
Políticas en relación a la violencia de género contra la mujer 1
¿Las reuniones fueron regulares o esporádicas? 2
Institutional CG (Administrative) Maximum score: 9
¿Hubo instancias institucionalizadas de planificación de las políticas y
cooperación en la implementación/seguimiento/evaluación en el nivel
nacional, e.g. entre ministerios?
1
¿Las reuniones fueron regulares o esporádicas? 2
Política sanitaria: definiciones sobre la cuarentena general 1
Política sanitaria: Políticas de detección 1
Política sanitaria: Organización de vacunación y distribución de vacunas 1
Política educativa: definición de cierre y reapertura escolar 1
Políticas de transferencia de ingreso/Protección de empleo/Subsidios 1
Políticas en relación a la violencia de género contra la mujer 1
Institutional CG (Inter-bureaucratic) Maximum score: 9
¿Hubo planificación de las políticas y cooperación en la implementación/
seguimiento/evaluación entre funcionarios de la burocracia nacional
con funcionarios de las burocracias subnacionales?
1
¿Las reuniones fueron regulares o esporádicas? 2
Política sanitaria: definiciones sobre la cuarentena general 1
Política sanitaria: Políticas de detección 1
Política sanitaria: Organización de vacunación y distribución de vacunas 1
Política educativa: definición de cierre y reapertura escolar 1
Políticas de transferencia de ingreso/Protección de empleo/Subsidios 1
Políticas en relación a la violencia de género contra la mujer 1
CG in Science and Technology Maximum score: 9
¿Hubo instancias de planificación de las políticas y cooperación en la
implementación/seguimiento/evaluación con especialistas en salud y
científicos con representantes del gabinete del gobierno nacional?
1
¿Las reuniones fueron regulares o esporádicas? 2
Política sanitaria: definiciones sobre la cuarentena general 1
Política sanitaria: Políticas de detección 1
(Continued)
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Table 4. Continued
Questions for Each Dimension of CG Scores
Política sanitaria: Organización de vacunación y distribución de vacunas 1
Política educativa: definición de cierre y reapertura escolar 1
Políticas de transferencia de ingreso/Protección de empleo/Subsidios 1
Políticas en relación a la violencia de género contra la mujer 1
Social CG Maximum score: 10
¿Hubo instancias de planificación de las políticas y cooperación en la
implementación/seguimiento/evaluación entre representantes de
organizaciones sociales y del gabinete del gobierno nacional?
1
¿Hubo instancias de planificación de las políticas y cooperación en la
implementación/seguimiento/evaluación entre representantes de
SINDICATOS y del gabinete del gobierno nacional?
1
¿Las reuniones fueron regulares o esporádicas? 2
Política sanitaria: definiciones sobre la cuarentena general 1
Política sanitaria: Políticas de detección 1
Política sanitaria: Organización de vacunación y distribución de vacunas 1
Política educativa: definición de cierre y reapertura escolar 1
Políticas de transferencia de ingreso/Protección de empleo/Subsidios 1
Políticas en relación a la violencia de género contra la mujer 1
Corporate CG Maximum score: 9
¿Hubo instancias de planificación de las políticas y mecanismos de
cooperación publico/privado entre representantes de las empresas
privadas y del gabinete del gobierno nacional?
1
¿Las reuniones fueron regulares o esporádicas? 2
Política sanitaria: definiciones sobre la cuarentena general 1
Política sanitaria: Políticas de detección 1
Política sanitaria: Organización de vacunación y distribución de vacunas 1
Política educativa: definición de cierre y reapertura escolar 1
Políticas de transferencia de ingreso/Protección de empleo/Subsidios 1
Políticas en relación a la violencia de género contra la mujer 1
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Table 5. The Five Dimensions of the Collaborative Governance Index (CGI) and Their Maximum
Value
Dimension Maximum Score
Inter-governmental Collaborative Governance 9
Inter-administrative Collaborative Governance 9
Inter-bureaucratic Collaborative Governance 9
Collaborative Governance in Science and Technology 9
Social Collaborative Governance 10
Corporate Collaborative Governance 9
Maximum Value Possible of CGI 55
Table 6. Breakdown of CGI per Country and Number of Deaths per Million, as Recorded on
January 27, 2021.














Costa Rica 28 504
Paraguay 25 372
El Salvador 19 244
Brazil 17 1030
Nicaragua 1 26
Next, we provide a list of all of the newspapers used to code the instances of collaboration above. We included
at least three newspapers per country and ensured that, while each of these had a high readership, they varied in
terms of their ideological position. (For Paraguay and Nicaragua, we only used two national newspapers.) Finally,
where necessary, we relied on official government sources, scientific publications, and experts to help address
any information that was not clear in the newspapers.
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Table 7. Newspaper Sources per Country.
Country Newspaper 1 Newspaper 2 Newspaper 3
Argentina La Nación Página 12 Perfil
Bolivia El Diario La Razón El Día
Brazil O Globo Fohla de San
Pablo
Correio do Brasil
Chile La Tercera Emol El Mercurio
Colombia El Tiempo La República Semana
Costa Rica El País República Nación
Ecuador Universo El Comercio La Hora
El Salvador La Prensa
Gráfica
El Salvador El Blog
Guatemala El Periódico República La Hora
Honduras La Prensa El Proceso La Tribuna
Mexico La Jornada El Universal Reforma
Nicaragua La Voz del
Sandinismo
La Prensa International sources (BBC, Forbes, France
24) were used in the absence of local
information.
Panama La Prensa La Vanguardia La Estrella
Paraguay ABC La Nación Ministerial information was used to
complement newspaper sources.
Peru El Comercio La República Agencia Peruana de Noticias
República
Dominicana
El Nacional El Nuevos
Diario
Listin Diario
Uruguay El Observador La Diaria El País
Venezuela Últimas
Noticias
El Universal El Nacional
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Appendix 2
Figure 3. (a) Relationship between COVID-related deaths per million inhabitants and
institutional CG and CG in science and technology and (b) CGI and deaths from COVID-19 (per
million inhabitants), Eighteen countries.
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